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The institution of the examining magistrate  
in the Second Polish Republic*
I. Discussions pertaining to the model of criminal procedure, especially its 
preliminary phase, have been taking place in Poland in recent years. The discus-
sions are, among others, about proposals which concern changes aimed at creating 
a broader scope of court control over the preliminary procedure. The possibility 
and validity of introducing the institution of the examining magistrate, in one 
form or another, or rather reinstating it as it existed in Poland in the past, is under 
consideration. It does not probably mean a return to the 19th century concept of 
a magistrate conducting an inquiry but rather it refers to a concept of the court or 
of the judge for the preliminary procedure, who would be appointed to carry out 
and control the steps undertaken in its course. The discussion pertaining to the 
changes of the model of the preliminary procedure, and especially reinstating the 
institution of the examining magistrate, is also accompanied by a revitalization 
of professional writing concerning this subject matter. A number of interesting 
publications on this topic have appeared in recent times.1 
* Original version: M. Materniak-Pawłowska, Instytucja sędziego śledczego w II Rzeczypo-
spolitej, „Czasopismo Prawno-Historyczne” 2013, Vol. LXV, issue 2.
1 K. Eichstaedt, Rola sądu w postępowaniu przygotowawczym a instytucja sędziego śled-
czego [The role of the court in the preliminary procedure and the institution of the examining 
magistrate], Warsaw 2009; C. Kulesza, Sędzia śledczy w modelu postępowania przygotowaw-
czego na tle prawnoporównawczym [The examining magistrate in the model of the preliminary 
procedure against the comparative and legal backdrop], Białystok 1991; idem, Sędzia śledczy 
we współczesnym procesie karnym (na tle prawnoporównawczym) [The examining magistrate in the 
contemporary criminal procedure (against the comparative and legal backdrop)], “Państwo i Prawo” 
[The State and the Law] 2008, issue 7, p. 20 et seq.; P. Kruszyński, M. Warchoł, Pozycja sędziego 
śledczego na tle modeli postępowania przygotowawczego [The position of the examining magistrate 
against the backdrop of the models of the preliminary procedure] (Part 1), “Palestra” [The Bar] 
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Consequently, it seems valid to present the model of this institution in greater 
detail from the moment it appeared on Polish territories during the period of the 
Partitions of Poland until it was abolished in the Stalinist era. However, the most 
important point of reference to contemporary times is the interwar period. It is 
especially salient as, due to the changing legislation, this institution was evolving 
and assuming different forms. For this reason, it is worthwhile to take a closer look 
at these solutions but also – which is equally interesting – to present the views of 
lawyers of that time – theoreticians and practitioners – concerning the usefulness 
of its existence, the scope of its duties as well as its relation to other organs which 
took part in the preliminary procedure, namely the public prosecutor’s office and 
the state police of the interwar period. 
The legal regulations concerning the examining magistrate which were in 
force during the interwar period are presented first. Among them are both the 
post-partitioning provisions which were initially in force and different in relation 
to particular areas of the state as well as the uniform regulations of the Polish 
legislator which were introduced in the second decade of the interwar period. Due 
to the fact that the subject matter concerning the examining magistrate is not ho-
mogenous, there are the regulations included in the criminal procedure on the one 
hand and the provisions pertaining to the system of the judiciary on the other. The 
former delineate the position of the examining magistrate in the procedure, espe-
cially the scope of their competence in the preliminary procedure as well as their 
relation to other organs which were taking part in it. The latter regulate the status 
of the magistrate: the method of appointment, the rights and duties of the magis-
trates, the rules of practicing the profession. Only an analysis of both the elements 
2008, No. 3–4, p. 49 et seq as well as (Part 2) No. 5–6, p. 44 et seq.; J. Tylman, Uwagi o modelu 
postępowania przygotowawczego [Remarks concerning the model of the preliminary procedure] 
[in:] P. Hofmański (ed.), Węzłowe problemy procesu karnego [The key problems of the criminal 
procedure], Warsaw 2010, p. 91 et seq.; T. Grzegorczyk, Kilka refleksji na temat sugestii wpro-
wadzenia instytucji sędziego śledczego [Several remarks concerning the suggestion to introduce 
the institution of the examining magistrate] [in:] P. Hofmański (ed.), Węzłowe problemy... [The 
key problems...], p. 105 et seq.; P. Kruszyński, M. Warchoł, Sędzia śledczy. Argumenty za i prze-
ciw [The examining magistrate. Arguments for and against] [in:] P. Hofmański (ed.), Węzłowe 
problemy... [The key problems...], p. 115 et seq.; C. Kulesza, Sędzia śledczy na tle zmian europej-
skich modeli postępowania przygotowawczego [The examining magistrate against the backdrop 
of the changes in the European models of the preliminary procedure] [in:] P. Hofmański (ed.), 
Węzłowe problemy... [The key problems...], p. 124 et seq.; R.A. Stefański, Krytycznie o obecnym 
modelu postępowania przygotowawczego [Critically about the present model of the preliminary 
procedure] [in:] P. Hofmański (ed.), Węzłowe problemy... [The key problems...], p. 146 et seq.; 
M. Kościelniak-Marszał, Sędzia śledczy w ujęciu prawno-historycznym [The examining magis-
trate according to the legal and historical approach] [in:] P. Hofmański (ed.), Węzłowe problemy... 
[The key problems...], p. 167 et seq.
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mentioned above can give a complete picture of this institution. A presentation 
of the most frequently expressed opinions pertaining to the essence, significance, 
and the position of the examining magistrate follows afterwards. 
II. The institution of the examining magistrate appeared for the first time in 
the European criminal procedure in the 19th century. It is a well-known fact that 
this institution’s model shape was created in Napoleonic France by virtue of the 
Code of criminal procedure (Code d’instruction criminelle) of 1808. However, 
its prototype can be found in a much earlier text, namely in a decree by Francis 
I of 1522. It was known back then as lieutenant criminel who was appointed to 
conduct inquiries and, simultaneously, to pass judgements (with the assistance 
of assessors). The Napoleonic Code of criminal procedure divided the procedure 
into two phases: the preliminary one and the main phase. The first phase was left 
in the hands of prosecutors and examining magistrates. The former were vested 
with the power to prosecute crimes and to launch inquiries, while the latter were 
vested with the power to conduct inquiries for the first time. This last power was 
obligatory in case of felonies and it was facultative in case of offences.2 The idea 
which was the guiding light for the creators of this institution was to ensure a solid 
and properly justified indictment, which was in turn supposed to prevent a reck-
less initiation of proceedings. The task of an examining magistrate was supposed 
to be not only to collect evidence of the crime which would incriminate a suspect 
and provide a basis for drawing up an indictment. It was also supposed to protect 
the people who did not commit criminal acts provided nothing indicated it in 
the course of the inquiry. The examining magistrate was supposed to constitute 
a better guarantee of the protection of an individual’s rights in the criminal proce-
dure thanks to their independence in comparison with a dependent prosecutor who 
could be dismissed from office.3 This model was gradually adopted in the majority 
of European countries; however, it was sometimes modified. The institution of 
the examining magistrate first appeared on Polish territories in the second half of 
the 19th century. What is more, it happened almost simultaneously on every parti-
tioned land: in 1873 in the Austrian Partition, in 1876 in the Russian Partition, and 
in 1877 in the Prussian Partition. Naturally, it took place as a result of the legis-
lation of the partitioning states even though it could have happened much earlier. 
2 S. Waltoś, Sędzia śledczy – rys historyczny [The examining magistrate – a historical out-
line] [in:] Nowy model postępowania przygotowawczego – sędzia śledczy. Konferencja. Warszawa 
22 marca 2010 r. [A new model of the preliminary procedure – the examining magistrate. A confer-
ence. Warsaw, the 22nd of March 2010], Warsaw 2010, pp. 16–17.
3 W. Nestorowicz, Stanowisko sędziego śledczego u nas i na Zachodzie [The position of the 
examining magistrate in Poland and in the West], “Głos Sądownictwa” [The Voice of the Judiciary] 
1932, issue 3, pp. 206–207.
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It nearly happened in the Duchy of Warsaw period when Feliks Łubieński, the 
Minister of Justice, strived to introduce the Napoleonic procedure there. However, 
in the end, he was unsuccessful. 
1. In the Austrian Partition, an already crystallized institution was brought 
about by the Austrian criminal procedure law of the 23rd of May 1873.4 It was in 
force on Polish territories not only until independence was regained but also in 
the first decade of the existence of the Second Polish Republic. It was replaced by 
the uniform Code of Criminal Procedure when it came into force on the 1st of July 
1929. It underwent numerous changes and it was supplemented many times dur-
ing this period which lasted for more than fifty years. Initially, the changes were 
made by the Austrian legislator and later they were introduced by the Polish leg-
islator. However, these changes did not pertain to the institution of the examining 
magistrate, which had been created by the Austrian legislation, and it remained in 
its original shape until the very end. 
The scope of activity of examining magistrates was limited to the district 
courts, which were called first instance tribunals in the Austro-Hungarian Empire 
period. They were appointed by the president of the judges of this court and the 
position was given to one or to several persons (§ 11 of the Austrian Code of 
Criminal Procedure). Their status was analogous to the status of other judges who 
adjudicated in the district courts.5 Even though examining magistrates were not 
appointed in other courts, neither in county courts nor in appeal courts (previously 
called second instance tribunals), not to mention the Supreme Court, however, 
similar procedural powers were also granted in certain circumstances to the coun-
ty courts. 
The role of the examining magistrate was mainly connected with the pre-
liminary procedure which took the form of a preliminary investigation or of an 
initial inquiry. The preliminary investigation included initial court proceedings 
(for instance, interrogations of persons, the examination of a crime scene) which 
were undertaken upon the motion of the prosecution or, in special circumstances, 
without such a motion (§ 88 and 89 of the Austrian Code of Criminal Proce-
dure). Prosecutors could demand the proceedings to be carried out by examining 
magistrates, county courts, or the police. In matters of great urgency, examining 
magistrates, and county courts in particular, which did not have a prosecutor in 
their seat, had the right to independently undertake court proceedings which were 
included in the scope of the preliminary procedure. However, they were obliged to 
4 “Reichsgesetzblatt für die im Reichrat(h)e vertretenen Königreiche und Länder” 1873, 
No. 119. 
5 M. Materniak-Pawłowska, Ustrój sądownictwa powszechnego w II Rzeczypospolitej [The 
system of common courts in the Second Polish Republic], Poznań 2003, pp. 117–121.
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inform the prosecutor of this fact. Examining magistrates, as well as county judg-
es, who conducted activities in the course of the preliminary procedure entered 
the scope of powers of judges carrying out initial inquiries (§ 88 of the Austrian 
Code of Criminal Procedure). After the preliminary investigation was completed, 
it was the magistrate’s duty to send the minutes of the undertaken activities to the 
prosecutor. In turn, the prosecutor made a decision regarding the further fate of 
the procedure. They could decide to refrain from further action if there were no 
grounds for it in the prosecutor’s opinion. Alternatively, they could transfer the 
case for an initial inquiry or to press charges straight away (§ 90 of the Austrian 
Code of Criminal Procedure). The initial inquiry could only commence upon the 
prosecutor’s motion and it took place in case of a specific suspect. Its aim was to 
establish whether a satisfactory premise existed in order to prepare an indictment 
or to refrain from further proceedings. It was obligatory in case of felonies, which 
were under the jurisdiction of jury trials as well as during in absentia cases (§ 91 
of the Austrian Code of Criminal Procedure). Conducting an initial inquiry was 
in the purview of examining magistrates who were independent in this area and 
unbound by further motions of the prosecution. However, they remained under the 
supervision of a special three-person department of a given district court. It was 
appointed at the beginning of each year and it was called an Advisory Chamber 
(§ 12 of the Austrian Code of Criminal Procedure). This institution, which had 
its roots in the French system but was significantly modified by the Austrian leg-
islation, occupied a superior position in relation to examining magistrates. This 
position was highlighted in numerous issues, for example: examining magistrates 
had to acquire a resolution of the Advisory Chamber in order to reject a motion to 
commence an initial inquiry made by the prosecution (§ 92 of the Austrian Code 
of Criminal Procedure) or to refrain from an initial inquiry without the prose-
cutor’s consent (§ 109 of the Austrian Code of Criminal Procedure); examining 
magistrates had the duty to make a report concerning the state of the ongoing ini-
tial inquiries to the Advisory Chamber at least once a month (§ 94 of the Austrian 
Code of Criminal Procedure); unsatisfied parties could make a complaint against 
each and every resolution of examining magistrates or delays on their part to the 
Advisory Chamber (§ 113 of the Austrian Code of Criminal Procedure).6 Moreo-
ver, the Advisory Chamber also had the right, in special cases, to transfer initial in-
quiries in full or in part to the county court which was located in the district (§ 12 
of the Austrian Code of Criminal Procedure). If the law provided for complaints 
6 E. Krzymuski, Wykład procesu karnego ze stanowiska nauki i prawa obowiązującego 
w b. dzielnicy austriackiej oraz z uwzględnieniem ważniejszych różnic na innych ziemiach polskich 
[The lecture on the criminal procedure from the position of the science and law in force in the former 
Austrian district and factoring in the more important differences on other Polish territories], Cracow 
1922, pp. 48–49.
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against the resolutions of the Advisory Chamber, then they were adjudicated by 
the competent court of appeal. The course of an initial inquiry itself as well as its 
scope depended on the plan made by an examining magistrate. The law did not re-
strain them in this sphere by any provisions. They conducted inquiries personally 
and independently of the prosecutor whose motions bound them only to the extent 
that rejecting motions required a decision of the Advisory Chamber. The criminal 
procedure law expressly stipulated that no inquiry actions could be carried out by 
the prosecutor and they were under pain of being null and void. However, it was 
possible to entrust certain activities which were part of the inquiry to the county 
court, both to courts which were within the district as well as to those which were 
outside the district of a given district court (§ 93 of the Austrian Code of Criminal 
Procedure). Neither the prosecutor nor the defence counsel could participate in the 
formal interrogation of the suspect or witnesses. However, they could take part in 
such activities as the examination of a crime scene or even indicate objects which 
in their opinion should have been included in the acts of inquiry. The decisions 
concerning ending an inquiry were also left at the discretion of examining magis-
trates even though there were some restrictions in this area. It was their complete-
ly independent decision to close an inquiry in a situation in which they decided 
that it provided a sufficient basis for the prosecution to draft an indictment against 
a suspect (§ 111 of the Austrian Code of Criminal Procedure). However, the de-
cision to refrain from an inquiry, if it did not provide a basis for drawing up an 
indictment, was made by a magistrate upon the motion of the prosecution or with 
the prosecutor’s consent. And, in case of absence of either, it required the consent 
of the Advisory Chamber (§ 109 of the Austrian Code of Criminal Procedure). 
2. In the Prussian Partition, the institution of the examining magistrate was 
mainly regulated by two legal acts from 1877: the judiciary act7 as well as the 
criminal procedure act.8 Both legal acts underwent changes and they were sup-
plemented by the German legislator. After Poland regained its independence, they 
were in force for ten more years and they underwent more changes and they were 
supplemented by the Polish legislator as well. Some of these changes pertained to 
the institution of the examining magistrate.9 
7 The Judiciary act (“Reichs-Gesetzblatt” 1877, No. 4, pp. 41–80).
8 The criminal procedure act (“Reichs-Gesetzblatt” 1877).
9 Among others: the regulation on the organization of the courts in the former Prussian district 
(“Tygodnik Urzędowy” [Official Weekly] 1919, issue 70, p. 410). See: Postępowanie karne obo - 
wiązujące na ziemiach zachodnich Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej. Zbiór ustaw i rozporządzeń dotyczą-
cych ustroju sądownictwa i procesu karnego z orzecznictwem Sądu Najwyższego [The criminal pro-
cedure in force in the western territories of the Republic of Poland. A set of acts and regulations con-
cerning the judiciary and the criminal procedure with the judicial decisions of the Supreme Court], 
compiled by J. Kałużniacki, R.A. Leżański, Warsaw – Poznań 1926, pp. 342.
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As a rule, examining magistrates also functioned only at the district courts. In 
contrast to other common court judges who were nominated by the President of 
the Second Polish Republic, examining magistrates (similarly to justices of the 
peace) were appointed by the Minister of Justice. Moreover, they were appointed 
for a specified period of time, i.e. for one administrative year (§ 60 of the German 
judiciary act). Furthermore, in accordance with the order of the president of the 
court, they could still conduct the inquiries which they had started earlier after 
this time elapsed (§ 64 of the German judiciary act). Examining magistrates were 
members of the district courts and their status did not vary from the status of the 
remaining judges. In special circumstances, the activities belonging to examining 
magistrates could also have been undertaken by county judges or by justices of 
the peace. 
The role of the examining magistrate was also mainly restricted to conducting 
initial inquiries, which was the second, beside the preliminary investigation, phase 
of the preliminary procedure. It was only obligatory in cases concerning felonies 
as well as criminal cases which belonged to the jurisdiction of the district courts 
and in which the motion to initiate inquiries was made by the prosecution or by 
the suspect, who produced significant reasons justifying such a need (§ 176 of 
the German criminal procedure act). Prosecuting crimes belonged in this territory 
mainly to the prosecution which was independent of courts. Moreover, the pros-
ecution had the duty to undertake action in case of any suspicion regarding acts 
which had been committed and which were subject to punishments (§ 152 of the 
German criminal procedure act). However, prosecuting crimes also belonged to 
the police to a certain extent (§ 156 of the German criminal procedure act). During 
the preliminary investigation, it was the duty of the prosecution to examine the 
circumstances of a case and make a final decision whether making an indictment 
which initiated an inquiry was valid. To this end, it could demand an explanation 
from all public authorities; it also could undertake action by itself (with the excep-
tion of interrogations under oath) or it could order the authorities, officers of the 
police service (§ 159 of the German criminal procedure act) and courts (§ 160 of 
the German criminal procedure act) to carry out the action. In case of the latter, it 
was possible to commission particular actions not only to examining magistrates 
who worked in the district courts but also to county judges or to justices of the 
peace. In justified cases, when a delay endangered the case, county judges or jus-
tices of the peace could undertake the necessary acts of inquiry ex officio (§ 163 
of the German criminal procedure act). In such situations, the way they proceeded 
was regulated by the legal provisions pertaining to the inquiry. After an investiga-
tion was completed and when the prosecution considered that there were sufficient 
grounds to make an indictment, they could make a petition to launch an initial 
inquiry. Alternatively, the prosecution made a petition directly to the court with an 
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indictment (with the exception of cases in which an inquiry was obligatory) or it 
could order an ex officio discontinuation of the proceedings (§ 168 of the German 
criminal procedure act). In contrast to Austria, the German criminal procedure did 
not provide for an investigation to be carried out by the courts. The investigation 
was carried out completely by a prosecutor who could commission judges to carry 
out certain actions. 
Similarly to the Austrian Partition, an inquiry could only commence upon the 
motion of the prosecution (§ 152 of the German criminal procedure act). Such 
a motion could have been rejected by a court resolution10 but only due to a lack 
of the jurisdiction of the court, inadmissibility of criminal prosecution or inad-
missibility of an inquiry in a given case, or in a situation in which the crime in 
the motion did not fall within the scope of any criminal provisions. An inquiry 
was conducted against a specific suspect regarding a specific charge against them 
(§ 177 of the German criminal procedure act). It was also possible to combine 
criminal cases, by virtue of a court resolution, which remained in connection to 
each other (§ 4 of the German criminal procedure act). An initial inquiry was 
conducted personally by an examining magistrate, however, in order to conduct 
respective acts of inquiry, they could summon county judges. Moreover, upon the 
motion of the prosecution and by virtue of a county court resolution, it was even 
possible to transfer the inquiry completely to a county judge (§ 183 of the German 
criminal procedure act). Acts of inquiry consisted, among others, in: interrogating 
suspects, witnesses, and expert witnesses; making examinations; issuing arrest 
warrants; and overruling arrest warrants with the consent of the prosecution. The 
prosecution had the right to access the inquiry records, learn of an inquiry’s status 
as well as to make such motions as the prosecution saw fit (§ 194 of the German 
criminal procedure act). However, complying with these motions was not obliga-
tory for examining magistrates because the district court was the last instance. Ex-
amining magistrates made decisions concerning ending an inquiry and they sent 
case files to the prosecution. The prosecution could petition for the initial inquiry 
to be supplemented or bring an indictment to the court with local jurisdiction. The 
petition to supplement the inquiry also did not absolutely bind the magistrate as 
the final decision in this situation lay with the district court, not with the prose-
cution. If there were no grounds to bring an indictment forward, then the district 
court made a decision to discontinue proceedings (§ 196 of the German criminal 
procedure act). The powers of the district courts resulted from § 204 of the Ger-
10 In accordance with § 72 of the German judiciary act, all decisions concerning initial inquir-
ies, which according to the provisions of the criminal procedure were issued by the court, belonged 
to the criminal chambers of this court. In particular, the criminal chambers made decisions concern-
ing appeals against the orders of an examining magistrate and also against the orders of a county 
judge and a justice of the peace who carried out acts of inquiry.
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man criminal procedure act and by its virtue no motions made by the prosecution 
were binding for the district courts.11 An examining magistrate who conducted an 
inquiry was excluded from adjudicating in a given case by virtue of the act, which 
meant that they could not participate in the latter stages of the proceedings (§ 23 
of the German criminal procedure act). In the former Prussian Partition, there was 
definitely no excess of the prosecution’s powers in relation to the powers of an 
examining magistrate. 
3. In the Russian Partition territories, the institution of the examining mag-
istrate was introduced on the basis of the judicial reform of 1864, which was in 
force in the Kingdom of Poland, with certain changes, since 1876. A part of this 
reform was the criminal procedure act as well as the judiciary act. On the territo-
ries of the Kingdom of Poland, namely in the contemporary Government General 
of Warsaw and the Government General of Lublin, the hitherto structure of the 
Russian judiciary was replaced with a new one in the form of the judiciary of the 
Kingdom of Poland in 1917 thanks to the efforts of the Department of Justice of 
the Provisional Council of State.12 Moreover, changes were made concomitantly 
in the Russian criminal procedure and it was also supplemented by issuing transi-
tory provisions to it.13 The changes pertained to the examining magistrate among 
others. After Poland regained its independence, regulations concerning both the 
system as well as the procedure underwent further amendments, which referred to 
this institution to a certain extent.14 
In light of the provisions of the Russian judiciary of 1864, which was introduced 
in the Kingdom of Poland in 1876, the examining magistrate was called a court 
trier (Russian sudiebnyj sledowatiel).15 They worked at the district courts but they 
11 W. Nestorowicz, Stanowisko sędziego śledczego... [The position of the examining magis-
trate...], p. 147.
12 Przepisy tymczasowe o urządzeniu sądownictwa w Królestwie Polskim [Provisional provi-
sions concerning the organization of the judiciary in the Kingdom of Poland] (The Official Journal 
of the Department of Justice of the Provisional Council of State of the 19th of August 1927, No. 1, 
Section I, item 1). See more about this subject matter in: M. Materniak-Pawłowska, Ustrój sądow-
nictwa powszechnego... [The organization of the common courts...], pp. 73–75.
13 Przepisy przechodnie do ustawy postępowania karnego [The transitory provisions for the 
criminal procedure act] (The Official Journal of the Department of Justice of the Provisional Council 
of State of the 19th of August 1927, No. 1, Section I, item 4).
14 Crucially important changes were introduced by virtue of the act of the 25th of February 1921 
concerning the changes in the criminal legislation in force in the former Russian Partition (Journal of 
Laws 1921, No. 30, item 169). Prosecutorial investigations were introduced then.
15 Article 6 of the Court Organization [in:] Ustawy sądowe obowiązujące w Guberniach 
Królestwa Polskiego na mocy najwyżej zatwierdzonego 19 lutego 1875 roku postanowienia o za-
stosowaniu ustaw sądowych z 20 listopada 1864 roku do warszawskiego Okręgu Sądowego [Judicial 
acts in force in the Governorates of the Kingdom of Poland by virtue of the supremely authorized 
decision of the 19th February 1875 concerning the appliciation of the judicial acts of the 20th of 
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were not considered the courts’ members and they did not participate in the general 
court assemblies. They were assigned a special district which was called an inquiry 
borough. The Minister of Justice had the right to appoint one of the triers working 
in a given district court to conduct particular inquiries in especially important cases 
(articles 79–80 of the Russian judiciary). Not only people who fulfilled the nec-
essary requirements to perform the duties of a judge but also court trainees could 
be appointed as triers provided they exhibited “wystarczającą wiedzą i praktyką 
w prowadzeniu śledztw” [sufficient knowledge and practice in conducting inquir-
ies] (article 205 of the Russian judiciary). The term “trier” disappeared from Polish 
provisions which constructed the judiciary of the Kingdom of Poland and it was sub-
stituted with the term “examining magistrate.” Their position also slightly changed. 
Since then, they functioned in district courts as one of its judges even though their 
status was not exactly the same as of the others. The differences pertained, inter alia, 
to their emolument because examining magistrates were classified into a different 
pay category than the judges of district courts. However, they could be appointed to 
complete an adjudication panel, if it was necessary, by the decision of the president 
of the court. Naturally, however, they could not participate in the adjudication of the 
cases in which they had conducted the inquiries earlier.16 
Examining magistrates performed their duties in their allotted districts (previ-
ously called boroughs) and they could only perform them on the area of a different 
precinct in emergencies. The districts were established and abolished by the Min-
ister of Justice, who also issued orders concerning changing their borders. 
The local provisions also regulated the practical, or more precisely the tech-
nical, side of performing the duties of an examining magistrate. In their light, one 
could say that examining magistrates had their own law firms at their disposal and 
they had the responsibility to be on duty there during the hours they determined 
themselves. Court trainees could be delegated to help them and they had the same 
rights at their disposal as well as duties as an examining magistrate in certain cas-
es. Examining magistrates had to present information on case movement in their 
districts to their respective district courts as well as to the prosecution.17 
In respect to the preliminary procedure, the procedure in Russia was char-
acterized by a large independence of the court and a highly limited role of the 
November 1864 to the Warsaw District Court], Vol. I: Organizacja sądowa i ustawa notarialna 
[Organization of the judiciary and the notary act], Saint Petersburg 1875, p. 5.
16 Article 6 Provisional provisions concerning the organization of the judiciary in the Kingdom 
of Poland.
17 Articles 67–75, Tymczasowa Instrukcja Ogólna dla sądów Królestwa Polskiego [Provisional 
General Instruction for the courts of the Kingdom of Poland] (The Official Journal of the Depart-
ment of Justice of the Provisional Council of State of the Kingdom of Poland of 1917, No. 2, Section 
III, item 4).
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prosecution, which was frequently reduced to supervision. Investigations were 
carried out by the police authorities, while inquiries were carried out by examin-
ing magistrates. An inquiry was obligatory in case of felonies and offences pun-
ished by a prison sentence,18 and later it was only obligatory in case of felonies. Its 
initiation was only possible upon the motion of the prosecution or on the personal 
initiative of an examining magistrate. In the latter case, it could concern situa-
tions in which the examining magistrates themselves had knowledge of a com-
mitted crime themselves or if a notification was made by the police, offices, or 
the perpetrators themselves (article 297 of the Russian criminal procedure). Ex-
amining magistrates could also independently decide that a case did not belong 
to the jurisdiction of a given district court and send the case files back as well as 
limit themselves to informing the prosecution (article 482 of the Russian criminal 
procedure). An extraordinary restriction of the prosecutor’s powers in relation to 
the court was a lack of the possibility to discontinue or suspend an inquiry by 
them due to its groundlessness or other legal reasons (article 518 of the Russian 
criminal procedure). They only had the possibility to make a proper motion to 
a district court and, in case the court did not express its consent to refrain from 
continuing an inquiry, the case was adjudicated by a court of appeal. This issue 
looked different in the Austrian-German procedure, as according to the adversarial 
principle of law, if the prosecution rescinded a complaint, then the procedure was 
discontinued.19 
In the course of conducting an inquiry, examining magistrates had consider-
able latitude. In relation to collecting evidence, one interesting construction de-
serves attention, namely the so-called community interview. Its purpose was to 
“naświetlenie wartości moralnej” [shed the light on the moral value] of a suspect 
on the basis of the interrogation of the witnesses (articles 457–460 of the Russian 
criminal procedure). Admittedly, the prosecution had the inquiry under constant 
supervision and they could put forward various motions. However, the motions 
did not infringe upon the independence of the examining magistrates. The mag-
istrates themselves were controlled by the district courts, while the courts were 
under the control of the courts of appeal. 
III. At the end of the 20s, the hitherto mosaic of provisions concerning the 
judiciary and the criminal procedure was replaced by a uniform law. In relation 
to the institution under discussion here, essential changes took place. Examining 
18 Article 8 The transitory provisions for the criminal procedure act.
19 J. Makarewicz, Procedura karna dla Królestwa Polskiego [The criminal procedure for the 
Kingdom of Poland], “Przegląd Prawa i Administracji” [The Law and Administration Review] 
1918, p. 195.
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magistrates possessed wide powers and their position was mainly independent in 
the course of the preliminary procedure till then, however, restrictions imposed on 
their powers and position were growing more and more. 
The uniform law on the system of common courts of 1928 included not only 
the institution of the examining magistrate hitherto appointed in each district court 
but also the institution of the examining magistrate for cases of exceptional impor-
tance who was appointed in the court of appeal.20 The institution of the examining 
magistrate for cases of exceptional importance was introduced on the territory of 
the entire state in 1927 by virtue of the regulation by the President of the Repub-
lic of Poland.21 Examining magistrates for cases of exceptional importance were 
appointed in the seat of the court of appeal and the scope of their activity included 
this whole court’s area. The decision concerning the validity of their appointment 
in a given court of appeal as well as their number belonged to the Minister of 
Justice. They were appointed by the President of the Republic of Poland upon the 
advice made by the Council of Ministers enacted on the initiative of the Minis-
ter of Justice (later, after the amendments introduced by the regulation of the 7th 
of October 1932, by the President of the Republic of Poland upon the advice of 
the Minister of Justice presented with the consent of the Prime Minister22) from 
among the persons who occupied the position of judges or prosecutors for at least 
five years. Their deputies were appointed by the general assembly of the court of 
appeal.23 In terms of their official position, they were made equal with other judg-
es of the court of appeal. The purpose of appointing this institution was to make 
it possible to concentrate inquiries concerning more serious crimes, which were 
committed in several districts, in the hands of one examining magistrate, who was 
more experienced, as well as to have inquiries conducted by a magistrate “stojący 
z dala od stosunków lokalnych” [who was far removed from the local relations].24 
20 The law on the system of common courts of the 6th of February 1928 (Journal of Laws 1928, 
No. 12, item 93).
21 The regulation of the President of the Republic of Poland of the 15th of July 1927 on the ex-
amining magistrates for cases of exceptional importance (Journal of Laws 1927, No. 69, item 611).
22 The regulation of the President of the Republic of Poland of the 7th of October 1932, which 
changed certain provisions of the Law on the system of common courts, introduced a uniform princi-
ple in relation to appointing all judges – appointing them by the President of the Republic of Poland 
upon the advice of the Minister of Justice presented with the consent of the Prime Minister (Journal 
of Laws 1932, No. 86, item 734).
23 § 18 item 3 of the General regulation concerning the internal operation of courts of appeal, 
district courts, and municipal courts (Journal of Laws 1928, No. 104, item 934).
24 Z nowego ustroju sądów powszechnych. Streszczenie i omówienie przepisów o ustroju sądów 
powszechnych ze szczegółowym uwzględnieniem przepisów o sądach pracy przez dr J. Wz. [From 
the new system of common courts. A summary and discussion on the provisions on the system of 
common courts with special attention paid to the provisions on the industrial tribunal by J. Wz., 
PhD], Cracow 1929, pp. 29–30.
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The examining magistrates for cases of exceptional importance undertook the 
conducting of an inquiry following a resolution of the Supreme Court, which was 
made upon the motion of the Minister of Justice as the Public Prosecutor General, 
or following a resolution of the Court of Appeal, which was made upon the motion 
of the prosecutor at the Court of Appeal. The prosecutor delegated by the Minis-
ter of Justice, or the prosecutor at the Court of Appeal or their deputy performed 
prosecutorial supervision of the activities carried out by them. A district court 
which was working in the seat of an examining magistrate for cases of exceptional 
importance constituted a higher instance institution. 
Appointing the institution of the examining magistrates for cases of excep-
tional importance was criticized in the doctrine. Among the raised issues was the 
fact that its creation generated suppositions that cases were not treated with equal 
attention in court: some were considered more important and given to the exam-
ining magistrates for cases of exceptional importance, while others – which were 
considered less important – were handed to the “regular” examining magistrates. 
One matter was considered to be an exceptional shortcoming, namely a lack of 
a precise statutory delineation pertaining to which cases were to be considered 
cases of exceptional importance. This, in turn, resulted in an unwanted freedom 
for the organs of the justice system.25 
The examining magistrates who worked in the district courts were district 
judges. The law on the system of common courts of 1928 formally abolished all 
differences which were previously present between the judges of a given district 
court. The hitherto examining magistrates, provided they had the qualifications 
required of judges (which was not an obvious matter, at least not in case of judges 
in the Russian Partition), became district judges by virtue of the law which came 
into force on the 1st of January 1929.26 There had to be certain doubts regarding 
this as it was additionally confirmed later by a ruling of the Supreme Court.27 
Consequently, their position in the hierarchy of the positions in the judiciary was 
firmed up and it was done so on a higher level than previously. Even though the 
formal status of the examining magistrates was made equal with the status of oth-
er judges of this court, they remained separate in respect to the difference in the 
function they performed. Moreover, their function, which consisted in conducting 
25 Ibidem, pp. 118–119. 
26 Article 280 § 2 of the Law on the system of common courts.
27 The Supreme Court ruling of the 12th of November 1929 [in:] Z. Nagórski, Prawo o ustroju 
sądów powszechnych z dn. 6 lutego 1928 według jednolitego tekstu z dn. 5 listopada wraz z ustawa-
mi i rozporządzeniami związkowymi i wykonawczymi oraz orzecznictwem Sądu Najwyższego [The 
law on the system of common courts of the 6th of February 1928 according to the uniform text of 
the 5th of November together with the union and executive acts and regulations as well as with the 
judicial decisions of the Supreme Court], Warsaw 1933, p. 9.
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acts of inquiry, was designated already at the time of their appointment and not by 
the general assembly of a given district court.28 However, in practice, contrary to 
the legal regulations, much more serious differences remained even though they 
were in accordance with the interpretation of the Ministry of Justice.29 The differ-
ences mainly pertained to the remuneration which the examining magistrates were 
supposed to be formally entitled to according to the same category as the district 
judges but, in reality, it belonged to one of the lower categories.30 
The number of examining magistrates was determined for each district court 
by the Minister of Justice. If it was necessary, the Minister also could designate 
the location of their seats outside the seat of a given district court.31 Moreover, it 
was formally in the purview of the Minister of Justice to abolish the examining 
magistrates’ positions. However, due to the fact that examining magistrates were 
district judges at the same time, they remained district judges even after the posi-
tion was liquidated (as this position could not be abolished independently by the 
Minister of Justice). And so, by virtue of the binding law, they were to be trans-
ferred to one of the court’s departments in accordance with the resolution of the 
general assembly of the court.32 It was a formal confirmation of the principle of 
equality of the examining magistrates with other district judges. However, a dif-
ferent practice was formed in this area due to the interpretation by the Ministry of 
Justice.33 To be more precise, transferring from the category of examining magis-
trates to the category of district judges and vice versa took place in the following 
manner – a candidate was chosen each time by the general assembly of the court 
and then they were appointed again by the President of the Republic of Poland.34 
The regulation of the 23rd of August 1932, which was an amendment to the Law 
28 A. Goldman, “Redukcja” sędziów śledczych w świetle przepisów prawa [“Reduction” of 
examining magistrates in the light of the provisions of law], “Gazeta Sądowa Warszawska” [The 
Warsaw Court Gazette] 1932, issue 27, p. 375.
29 Article 57 § 3 of the Law on the system of common courts.
30 N. Dąbrowicki, Jeszcze o uposażeniu sędziów okręgowych śledczych [More on the salaries 
of examining district magistrates], “Głos Sądownictwa” [The Voice of the Judiciary] 1931, issue 5, 
pp. 282–285.
31 Article 5 of the Law on the system of common courts.
32 § 17 item 2 of the General regulation concerning the internal operation of the courts of 
appeal, district courts, and municipal courts (Journal of Laws 1928, No. 104, item 934). See also 
W. Wiszniewski, O trybie zwijania stanowisk sędziów okręgowych śledczych [The procedure of 
liquidating the positions of examining district magistrates], “Głos Sądownictwa” [The Voice of the 
Judiciary] 1930, issues 7/8, pp. 443–445.
33 W. Nestorowicz, Odmęty interpretacyjne [Interpretational maelstrom], “Głos Sądownictwa” 
[The Voice of the Judiciary] 1931, issue 4, pp. 218–221.
34 W. Chmielarz, Wybieranie sędziów okręgowych śledczych na stanowisko sędziów okręgo-
wych [Selecting examining district magistrates for the position of district judges], “Głos Sądownictwa” 
[The Voice of the Judiciary] 1929, issue 4, pp. 176–177.
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on the system of common courts of 1928, introduced – in case the position of the 
examining magistrate was abolished in a given town – the possibility of designat-
ing a different seat to the person performing these duties on the territory of a given 
district court without any change in the performed function.35 
The issue of the reduction of the positions of examining magistrates was ex-
tremely emotive, especially the manner in which it was carried out in practice. 
There was complete freedom in the judicial administration due to a lack of precise 
secondary legislation, which would indicate the criteria deciding whether a given 
magistrate should be stripped of the inquiry functions. In certain cases, profes-
sional seniority in general was the deciding factor, while in other cases service 
duration at a given court decided; it should be noted that this seniority could result 
in a magistrate remaining at his duties but the result was quite opposite in other 
cases – seniority, especially when it gave the right to an early retirement, caused 
a person to be removed from the position and a younger one was installed instead. 
Other factors sometimes played a major role.36 
The total number of examining magistrates oscillated between 142 (in 1936) 
and 247 (in 1929). In the following years, the number equalled: in 1928 – 241 ex-
amining magistrates, in 1929 – 247, in 1930 – 231, in 1932 – 161, in 1934 – 210, 
in 1936 – 142, in 1937 – 171. The largest number of examining magistrates was 
in the Warsaw appeal district and there were also many of them in the appeal dis-
tricts in Lublin and Vilnius, while the smallest number was in Cracow, Poznań, 
and Toruń. For instance, the 231 examining magistrates in 1930 were divided in 
the following manner between the different appeal districts: Warsaw – 89 examin-
ing magistrates, Lublin – 48, Vilnius – 46, Lviv – 25, Katowice – 11, Poznań – 6, 
Toruń – 4, and Cracow – 2.37 
The practice of the Ministry of Justice concerning the appointment of persons 
for the function of examining magistrates consisted in frequently entrusting it to 
people with small professional experience, and sometimes even to assessors. It 
was not conducive to creating a proper relation between examining magistrate, 
prosecutors, and the police, who all were organs which cooperated during the 
preliminary procedure. Young, inexperienced magistrates frequently could not in-
spire authority which was due to their position.38 
35 Regulation of the President of the Republic of Poland of the 23rd of August 1932 changing 
some of the provisions of the Law of the system of common courts (Journal of Laws 1932, No. 73, 
item 661).
36 A. Goldman, “Redukcja”... [“Reduction”...], p. 375.
37 J. Szarycz, Sędziowie i sądy w Polsce w latach 1918–1988 [The judges and courts in Poland 
between 1918 and 1988], Warsaw 1988, pp. 22–23.
38 S. Waltoś, Sędzia śledczy... [The examining magistrate...], p. 19.
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In light of the Code of Criminal Procedure of 1928, the main duty of ex-
amining magistrates and magistrates for cases of exceptional importance was to 
conduct inquiries. Certain actions were also provided for them in the course of 
the investigations conducted by the prosecution or by the police. Occasionally, in 
accordance with the system provisions, they also could be appointed to complete 
the composition of the court and it meant performing a different function, namely 
that of adjudication. 
The purpose of an investigation was to arrive at a conclusion whether a crime 
had been indeed committed, who could be suspected of committing it, and were 
there sufficient grounds for a prosecutor to instigate court proceedings (article 243 
§ 1 of the Code of Criminal Procedure). Court activities were carried out by an ex-
amining magistrate or by the municipal court during an investigation. The choice 
of the proper entity belonged to whoever was to conduct the investigation, i.e. to 
the prosecution or to the police. The activities included: interrogating suspects; 
interrogating a witness under oath if there were concerns that the witness may not 
be able to appear at the main trial or that the witness would not tell the truth with-
out swearing the oath; examining the mental state of the suspect as well as under-
taking steps to determine physical evidence if there were concerns that it would 
not be possible to recreate the evidence without reading out the report concerning 
this activity during the main trial (article 251 of the Code of Criminal Procedure). 
After the amendments were made to the Code of Criminal Procedure in 1932, the 
catalogue of these activities was expanded to include, among others, interrogat-
ing witnesses of the victim, persons who apprehended or brought in a suspect as 
well as interrogating witnesses who lived outside the district of a given district 
court.39 Consequently, the powers of examining magistrates and of the municipal 
courts which were a part of the investigation mainly pertained to securing evi-
dence in a procedural manner for the adjudicating court. In emergencies, i.e. when 
the magistrate was not present at the scene of a crime and a delay could result in 
the disappearance of traces or evidence of the crime, some of these court activities 
could have been undertaken by the prosecutor or by the police. However, exam-
ining the mental state of a suspect was not among them. The right to deputize for 
the organs of the court by the prosecution or by the police in court activities was 
particularly criticized.40 Inquiries were procedures conducted by the examining 
magistrates, the examining magistrates for cases of exceptional importance, or – 
39 The act of the 21st January 1932 changing some provisions of the criminal procedure (Journal 
of Laws 1932, No. 10, item 60).
40 A. Mogilnicki, Czynności sądowe w toku dochodzenia według k.p.k. i projektu Komisji 
Kodyfikacyjnej [Court activities in the course of an investigation according to the Code of Criminal 
Procedure and the project of the Codification Committee], “Gazeta Sądowa Warszawska” [The Warsaw 
Court Gazette] 1929, issue 49, pp. 733–737.
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in cases when they were conducted outside the seat of the district court – by the 
municipal court (article 258 of the Code of Criminal Procedure). It was only insti-
gated in cases belonging to the jurisdiction of a district court in the first instance 
and its purpose was a comprehensive explanation of the circumstances of the case 
and providing the public prosecutor with the necessary information concerning 
the validity of initiating court proceedings or discontinuing proceedings as well as 
preserving evidence for the sentencing court (article 259 of the Code of Criminal 
Procedure). Initiating an inquiry took place upon the motion of the prosecution or 
upon the motion of the suspect. If the examining magistrate did not agree with the 
prosecutor’s motion, then they presented the case to the district court to decide 
and only activities which could not be delayed were undertaken (article 262 of 
the Code of Criminal Procedure). However, when the motion to initiate an inquiry 
was made by the suspect, then they could independently make a decision whether 
to initiate an inquiry or to dismiss the motion. All the decisions of the examining 
magistrate and of the district court concerning initiating inquiries were subject 
to lodging an appeal in the form of a complaint (articles 262–264 of the Code of 
Criminal Procedure). 
Magistrates were duty bound to immediately interrogate suspects (unless they 
were interrogated earlier according to article 168, for example by another exam-
ining magistrate, after they were brought in after they had been apprehended) and 
issue a decision to put the suspect on remand within 24 hours (article 265 of the 
Code of Criminal Procedure). If the suspect was already in jail, and the magistrate 
decided there were no grounds for it, then it was their duty to release the suspect 
without delay.41 In the course of an inquiry, examining magistrates undertook all 
possible actions on their own initiative and among them were: interrogating wit-
nesses under oath; examining the circumstances of the case by interrogating wit-
nesses, expert witnesses, conducting inspections or searches; making decisions 
concerning forfeiture of bail money or collecting the bail; allowing sides and their 
counsels to review the case files and to make authenticated copies, even though 
the sides had the right to make motions to the magistrates. The magistrate’s in-
dependence was restricted by all legal motions of the prosecution, among which 
were included practically all motions provided for in the act, for instance motions: 
to carry out evidence activities, to acquire consent to review the files, to take the 
oath of witnesses, to overrule or to soften preventive measures, and others.42 The 
prosecutor had the right to participate in all acts of inquiry, while the examining 
41 E. Wiśniewski, Sporne kwestie z zakresu śledztwa [Contentious issues in the area of the in-
quiry], “Głos Sądownictwa” [The Voice of the Judiciary] 1931, issue 5, p. 276.
42 K. Eichstaedt, Rola sądu w postępowaniu przygotowawczym a instytucja sędziego śledczego 
[The role of the court in the preliminary procedure and the institution of the examining magistrate], 
Warsaw 2009, p. 61.
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magistrate had the right to make decisions concerning the presence of the sides 
(article 268 of the Code of Criminal Procedure). 
If examining magistrates determined there were no grounds to suppose that 
the continuation of the inquiry could provide grounds for the main trial, then they 
informed the prosecutor about it; however, they did not have the competence to 
dismiss the proceedings themselves (article 271 of the Code of Criminal Proce-
dure). On the other hand, they had the right to dismiss the inquiry if auxiliary 
prosecutors or private prosecutors demanded it or agreed to it as well as on de-
mand or with the consent of the prosecution (article 272 of the Code of Criminal 
Procedure). Later, after the amendments introduced in 1932, they had to dismiss 
the inquiry obligatorily if the prosecutor demanded it. After deciding that the in-
quiry had already provided grounds for the main trial, the examining magistrate 
made the decision to close it. 
IV. The Code of Criminal Procedure was amended many times since it had 
come into force and these amendments pertained also to the institution of the ex-
amining magistrate. There was only one direction of these changes: increasing the 
powers of the prosecutor and simultaneously decreasing the powers of the mag-
istrate. In effect, two entities competed in the inquiry, the examining magistrate 
and the prosecutor, which influenced its course by delaying it and making it longer 
unnecessarily, and sometimes even by taking away the factual sense from the ex-
amining magistrate’s actions. Because in practice, after receiving a notification of 
committing a crime, the prosecutor as a rule did not transfer the case directly to 
the examining magistrate but they conducted an investigation themselves with the 
aim of clarifying whether a crime had been committed, who could be suspected 
of committing it as well as if there were grounds to initiate court proceedings. As 
a consequence, already at this stage of the proceedings, the prosecution had to de-
cide whether there were grounds to assign a punishable act to a particular person. 
In order to be able to ascertain it, the prosecutor had at their disposal many legal 
options, which in principle were similar to the powers of the examining magistrate 
in the course of an inquiry.43 
The practice of conducting inquiries was far from perfect. Examining mag-
istrates received too many cases and, as a result, some of them had to wait for 
a long time before they were undertaken. In turn, this caused the results of such 
dragged out or postponed inquiries to be scant. Additionally, young and inexpe-
rienced judges and assessors, who often performed the functions of examining 
magistrates, did not constitute a guarantee that the inquiries would be carried out 
properly. They did not possess professional experience, including special qualifi-
43 A. Eimer, O nowy ustrój Prokuratury [For the new system of the prosecution], “Głos 
Sądownictwa” [The Voice of the Judiciary] 1935, issue 10, pp. 710–711.
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cations to conduct difficult and complicated inquiries, but they even lacked nor-
mal life experience, which was also very useful to carry out such duties.44 Exam-
ining magistrates were so taxed by their workload that circular letters calling for 
decreasing the number of inquiries were even issued in individual court districts.45 
V. The discussion concerning the institution of the examining magistrates as 
well as the model of the preliminary procedure became heated in legal environ-
ments only under the rule of the unified law. There were not many comments 
in the professional press previously and they mainly pertained to the interpreta-
tions of the provisions in force and not to their detailed analysis. This probably 
stemmed from considering the postpartitioning legal situation as temporary and 
concentrating on following the work on the uniform law. Finally, however, the 
adopted solutions did not satisfy anyone, neither the theorists nor the legal prac-
titioners (the judges and the prosecutors were also included in the latter group), 
which resulted in them being widely criticised and there were even bigger waves 
of criticism starting from the middle of the thirties. 
An essential contentious issue in the interwar doctrine was the issue of the 
validity of existence of the institution of the examining magistrate. A large num-
ber of people advocated the theory which considered that this institution was su-
perfluous in the criminal procedure. Perhaps the main source was of this opinion 
was its imperfect legal form. The proponents of abolishing the institution of the 
examining magistrate postulated transmitting the entire preliminary procedure 
into the hands of the prosecutor. It was mainly advocated by the principle stating 
that the prosecutor takes the responsibility for indicting a particular person and, 
as a consequence, they should personally undertake all activities to ascertain 
the actual and legal state of a case. It was argued that only gathering all these 
competences in one hand could guarantee an accurate evaluation of the circum-
stances of the case and the validity of a possible indictment. The prosecutor 
preparing the indictment should not only be acquainted with the case through 
the files prepared by the court organs but directly through their own actions.46 In 
this situation, the role of the court was to be limited only to passing sentences, 
while the institution of the examining magistrate was becoming obsolete.47 It 
was emphasized that this concept had obvious advantages: removing the harm-
44 S. Lipień, Czy sędzia śledczy jest jeszcze potrzebny? [Is the examining magistrate still neces-
sary?], “Głos Sądownictwa” [The Voice of the Judicary] 1936, issue 2, p. 135.
45 J. Wayzner, Przygotowawcze postępowanie karne w praktyce [The criminal preliminary pro-
cedure in practice], “Głos Sądownictwa” [The Voice of the Judiciary] 1935, issue 6, p. 434.
46 A. Eimer, Prokurator czy sędzia śledczy [The prosecutor or the examining magistrate], “Głos 
Sądownictwa” [The Voice of the Judiciary] 1936, issue 5, pp. 390–391.
47 A. Eimer, O nowy ustrój... [For the new system...], “Głos Sądownictwa” [The Voice of the 
Judiciary] 1935, issue 10, pp. 710–712.
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ful competition between the examining magistrate and the prosecution, abolish-
ing the faulty institution of the inquiry as well as bringing the prosecutor closer 
to the society. This last factor was particularly accentuated as one of special 
importance from the point of view of the best interest of the society. It was even 
suggested that prosecutors who possessed expanded powers should be assigned 
a registered office outside of the seat of the prosecutor’s office. The purpose of 
this was to facilitate the local population’s access to the prosecutor which was 
supposed to lead to the creation of an actual contact between the prosecutor and 
the citizens. It was simultaneously postulated that the prosecutor’s tasks con-
nected with general prevention should increase. 
The view that the legislator divided the functions which made up one prelim-
inary procedure between the prosecutor and the examining magistrate was fre-
quent. The reason behind this was the opinion that the legislator was distrustful 
of one of these two entities, namely of the prosecutor. That is why the legislator 
strived to limit their competences and transferred many of their competences to 
the examining magistrate. However, it was emphasized that the law on the system 
of common courts of 1928 did not make any major distinction between the repre-
sentatives of these two legal professions in regard to their professional preparation 
and the requirements of the professional ethics. The same studies were required 
and the same legal apprenticeship had to be completed. Moreover, it was even al-
lowed to more or less freely move from one of these professions to the other. The 
arguments against the opinion that considered the prosecutor to be less objective 
than the magistrate indicated that the prosecutor’s actions were not only directed 
at bringing forth an indictment against the suspect, as their role did not end when 
the indictment was prepared. It continued in the course of the court proceedings 
when their statements were evaluated by the court and by the society if the case 
was not conducted at closed sessions. The following was stated: 
Żaden oskarżyciel publiczny nie ma interesu w tym, aby narażać się na ciężki 
zarzut, iż zniekształca rzeczywisty obraz wydarzeń, przy tym możność wysnu-
wania z nich jednostronnych wniosków jest nader ograniczona. Jak wyglądałby 
wobec społeczeństwa i władzy przełożonej stróż praw, któryby wniósł niesłuszne 
oskarżenie i przekręcił fakty? [No public prosecutor has any interest in facing the 
heavy accusation of distorting the actual picture of events and simultaneously the 
possibility of coming to one-sided conclusions is extremely limited. How would 
a peace officer look in the eyes of the society or of the superior authority if they 
made an unfair indictment and twisted the facts?].48 
48 H. Chutkiewicz, Kto ma utrwalać materiały dla procesu karnego? [Who is to record mate-
rials for the criminal procedure?], “Głos Sądownictwa” [The Voice of the Judiciary] 1936, issue 5, 
p. 392.
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Even the fact that the division of acts included in the preliminary procedure 
was more conducive to irregularities than putting them only in the hands of the 
prosecutor was raised. The issue of accountability for the course of the prelimi-
nary procedure and for its result was not entirely settled. A prosecutor who made 
an unsubstantiated indictment could, in case the existing model was preserved, 
shift the responsibility onto the examining magistrate, while if they were to bear 
the full responsibility for the entire procedure, then they would be more deter-
mined to explain the case to the best of their ability because if 
[...] nie będzie mógł przerzucić na innych odpowiedzialności za powolność, złe 
załatwianie lub paczenie sprawy, [...] postara się załatwiać sprawy szybko i do-
brze [they could not shift the responsibility onto others for tardiness, conducting 
the case badly or bungling it, [...] they will attempt to conduct the cases fast and 
properly].49 
However, voices were also raised which advocated preserving the institution 
of the examining magistrate. Generally, the necessity of its reform was noticed 
then and sometimes even of an essential reform. As a remedy for the irregularities 
which occurred in the preliminary procedure, especially in the form of protracted 
inquiries, strengthening the position of the examining magistrate at the expense of 
the prosecutor’s role was proposed and it was connected with the introduction of 
a more correct staff policy in the judiciary. The positions of examining magistrates 
were to be filled by people with the biggest experience and the best professional 
skills and not by young lawyers, which was the hitherto prevailing method. Their 
position in the court hierarchy was to be especially strengthened or at least made 
fully and actually equal with the position of adjudicating judges. These magis-
trates were supposed to be equipped with all the necessary means to act in a proper 
and rapid manner, while their hitherto limitations, existing mainly because of the 
prosecutor, were to be abolished. The magistrate was supposed to independent-
ly make decisions concerning the next stages of the inquiry, including finishing 
it. There was another interesting proposition, namely the project of creating in-
quiry departments in the district courts, which were to be headed by a separate 
vice-president or by one that would be shared with the criminal department. The 
number of examining magistrates was to depend on the current needs, which were 
naturally changing, which meant the possibility of delegating adjudicating judg-
es to inquiries and vice versa – delegating examining magistrates to adjudicate. 
The inquiry department was to have its own office with a separate secretary. The 
vice-president was to acquire constant access into the rational division of the work 
49 Ibidem, p. 393. 
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in the department, while the examining magistrates were to have the necessary 
platform for cooperation.50 
The scope and character of the activities undertaken in the course of the pre-
liminary procedure was also supposed to be a reason why the institution of the 
examining magistrate should be retained. The difficulty, according to many, in 
having them completed solely by the prosecution, even when it was supported 
by the police, was behind this reasoning. The fact that certain activities required 
particular knowledge and discernment, which was rather the characteristic of the 
magistrate than of the other organs taking part in this procedure, was also raised: 
[...] istnieje [...] wielka grupa spraw, gdzie zbierania materiałów w formie prze-
słuchiwania świadków, wyszukiwania i badania dowodów rzeczowych, absolut-
nie nie można powierzyć tak mało wykwalifikowanemu w tym względzie organo-
wi, jakim jest policja państwowa [there exists [...] a great group of cases in which 
collecting materials in the form of interrogating witnesses, searching for physical 
evidence and examining them which absolutely cannot be entrusted to an organ 
with low qualification in this area, which the state police is].51 
Even though the prosecutor in professional matters, as it was claimed, was ca-
pable of performing these duties with equal success as the examining magistrate, 
it was inevitably supposed to lead to overburdening them with work. As a result, 
it would lead to lowering the quality of effects of the preliminary procedure. It 
was also emphasized that the character of the examining magistrate’s work was 
frequently monotonous and arduous, as it was based on “metodyczne i powolne 
badanie różnych hipotez, z których jedna w końcu okaże się słuszną” [methodical 
and sluggish study of various hypotheses from among which one finally turns 
out to be true],52 and it was something completely different from the work of the 
prosecutor, which was “tocząca się wartką strugą, żywa i wieloraka” [fast-paced, 
lively, and multi-faceted],53 which consisted in the evaluation of the collected ma-
terial to check the validity of indicting someone as well as in the participation in 
the latter stages of the court proceedings. And even though, as it was emphasized, 
it would be beneficial to combine the function of the prosecutor and of the ex-
amining magistrate in one person from the economic point of view of the justice 
system, it would not be beneficial from the point of view of effectiveness. Only 
50 S. Lipień, Czy sędzia śledczy... [Is the examining magistrate...], pp. 135–136.
51 W. Strumieński, Sędzia śledczy czy prokurator [The examining magistrate or the prosecutor], 
“Głos Sądownictwa” [The Voice of the Judiciary] 1935, issue 11, p. 785.
52 Ibidem, p. 786.
53 Ibidem.
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when they functioned separately and performed different procedural roles, the two 
organs complemented each other excellently. 
Finally, the institution of the inquiry itself was criticized as it was considered 
insufficient to fulfil important social needs. The delayed moment of initiating an 
inquiry as well as its slow course was evaluated the worst. The dependence of 
initiating an inquiry on the motion of the prosecutor was considered to be one 
of the reasons behind the ineffectiveness of the examining magistrate’s work as 
cases were from time to time transferred into their hands too late to properly find 
and preserve the evidence of the committed crime. This happened due to the fact 
that the prosecutor waited until they received proper material from the police or-
gans in the form of an investigation in order to make a motion for an inquiry 
to be initiated. It was emphasized that inquiries preceded by such investigations 
were limited to a large extent to repeating the acts which had already been carried 
out in the course of the investigation with the sole difference being, a negative 
one for the inquiries, that they were conducted much later and so they were not 
done while “everything was still hot.” There were also voices in this matter which 
claimed that, since the examining magistrate only “reworked” for the second time 
the material which had already been ascertained in the course of the investigation, 
it meant that an inquiry was initiated unnecessarily or the examining magistrates 
conducted it incompentently.54 A reconstruction of the investigation and of the 
inquiry was also postulated. It was to be carried out in such a way as to give them 
an equal chance to complete the tasks of immediately collecting and preserving 
evidence set before them, without repeating the work, however. It was mainly 
supposed to lead to making it possible for examining magistrates to collect evi-
dence at the scene of the crime directly after it had been committed and initiating 
an inquiry independently of the prosecutor’s motion. The proposed combination 
of the function of the examining magistrate with the organs of the investigation 
department of the police was viewed as a practical and justified solution. This 
department would be led by an examining magistrate in the course of the conduct-
ed acts of inquiry but also during investigations into cases of lesser significance 
than the ones conducted in the course of an inquiry. Investigations into cases of 
the smallest importance were to be left to state police stations and precincts. In 
summary, it was claimed that: 
[...] tego rodzaju organizacja dochodzeń i śledztw niewątpliwie bardziej odpo-
wiadałaby nowoczesnym sposobom walki z przestępcami i przestępstwem, dając 
jednocześnie maksimum pewności nienaruszania nietykalności osobistej, tej pod-
waliny wolności obywatelskiej, a w związku z reorganizacją instytucji sędziów 
54 J.E. Grabowski, W obronie śledztwa [In defence of the inquiry], “Głos Sądownictwa” [The 
Voice of the Judiciary] 1935, issue 12, p. 871.
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śledczych i śledztwa jako takiego, wyłoniłaby się potrzeba częściowej również 
reorganizacji dotychczasowego ustroju tak prokuratur, jak i sądów powszechnych 
[this type of organization of investigations and inquiries would undoubtedly cor-
respond more to the modern methods of fighting criminals and crime, giving at 
the same time maximum certainty of bodily inviolability remaining intact, this 
foundation of civil liberties, and, in connection with the reorganization of the 
institution of examining magistrates and of inquires as such, there would also 
appear a need to partially reorganize the hitherto system of both the prosecutor’s 
office and of the common courts].55 
VI. Let us try to summarize the comments above. The discussion concerning 
its validity as well as concerning the scope of functioning of the institution of the 
examining magistrate was a part of several wide-ranging areas. The first one of 
them was connected with the postulate of reforming the preliminary procedure, 
especially making it uniform. As it was emphasized, this procedure had various 
forms: informal investigations, the so-called simplified procedure, carried out by 
the police; formal investigations, the so-called prosecutorial investigation; court 
investigations as well as inquiries. Various combined forms were added to them 
which from time to time combined different types in one case. According to many, 
all of this had a negative influence on the course of the procedure. That is the reason 
behind the repeated postulate of unifying this phase of the criminal procedure.56 
According to a frequently expressed opinion, the most adverse factor in obtaining 
the results of the preliminary procedure was the variety of the entities taking part 
in it, in different scope and on different stages. Consequently, concentrating the 
entire preliminary procedure in one hand and in one basic form was supposed to 
guarantee continuity, efficiency, and impartiality in the pursuit of criminals. The 
prosecution was most frequently considered to be the most suitable organ for this 
purpose. However, the thesis concerning the necessity of concentrating the pre-
liminary procedure in the hands of the prosecutor was persistently opposed with 
the view concerning the possibility, and even the need for cooperation between the 
prosecutor and the examining magistrate for the good of this procedure. Thanks to 
55 J. Salewicz, Ustawowa konstrukcja śledztwa w praktyce [The statutory construction of the 
inquiry in practice], “Głos Sądownictwa” [The Voice of the Judiciary] 1935, issue 2, p. 103.
56 E. Wiśniewski, Uwagi w sprawie reformy postępowania przygotowawczego karnego [Com-
ments concerning the issue of the reform of the preliminary criminal procedure], “Głos Sądownictwa” 
[The Voice of the Judiciary] 1936, issue 1, pp. 46–50; M. Hauswirt, S. Popower, Proponowane 
zmiany śledztwa i dochodzenia w świetle zasad procesowych [The proposed changes in the inquiry 
and in the investigation in light of the procedural rules], “Archiwum Kryminologiczne” [The Ar-
chive of Criminology], Vol. I, issue 2, p. 255 et seq.; J. Kondratowicz, Czy potrzebna jest reforma 
postępowania przygotowawczego karnego [Is a reform of the preliminary criminal procedure neces-
sary?], “Gazeta Sądowa Warszawska” [The Warsaw Court Gazette] 1935, issues 17/18.
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this cooperation, the detection of the entire material truth, i.e. achieving the main 
purpose of the procedure, was supposed to be easier. 
Czyż można twierdzić, że taka dyskusja dwóch czynników, występujących 
w śledztwie jest szkodliwa, niepotrzebna, że przeciwnie istnieje potrzeba jed-
nolitości? Zapewne, doraźne efekty może łatwiej osiągnąć jeden człowiek, niż 
dwóch, ale przecież śledztwo dąży do wykrycia prawdy materialnej, do czego 
rozważenie danego zagadnienia z różnych punktów widzenia może być tylko ko-
rzystne” [Can one claim that such a discussion between the two factors present 
in the inquiry is harmful, unnecessary, on the contrary, that there exists a need 
of uniformity? Most assuredly, immediate effects can be more easily achieved 
by one person rather than by two people, however, an inquiry aims to detect the 
material truth, and considering a given issue from different points of view can 
only be beneficial].57 
The second important area of discussion pertained to the effectiveness, or to 
be more precise, the lack of the effectiveness of the inquiry itself in practice. The 
frequently repeated thesis concerning the slow pace of inquiries was opposed by 
the argument which mainly indicated the complexity of matters it was the object 
of as well as the necessity of the examining magistrate personally conducting al-
most all the acts. A kind of short-term remedy to this phenomenon was supposed 
to be the betterment of work conducted by the auxiliary organs of the examining 
magistrate. However, the accusation concerning sluggishness, which was raised, 
was irrelevant as difficult and complex cases (and inquiries were only initiated in 
such cases) should not be conducted with haste and inaccuracy.58 The blame for 
delaying an inquiry was usually put on the procedures initiating it, which depend-
ed on the prosecutor’s motion. However, there were polemics concerning this 
issue as well. For instance, it was stated that the fact that the prosecutor initiates 
an inquiry did not necessarily influence the delay of this procedure as the motion 
could be made over the telephone, which was actually practiced quite often. Also 
the police, after being informed that a crime had been committed, could and did 
inform the prosecution of this fact by phone, which significantly accelerated the 
proceedings. The fact that examining magistrates sometimes repeated some of 
the actions, which had already been carried out in the course of the investigation, 
stemmed from the fact that the prosecution only decided there was a need for an 
inquiry after the investigation had been completed and this was also a justification 
for some delay in its initiation. Furthermore, it was most frequently the examining 
magistrate’s task to explain such circumstances of a case which required carrying 
57 J.E. Grabowski, W obronie... [In defence...], p. 870.
58 Ibidem, p. 871.
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out a number of court activities backed by legal knowledge. However, the ac-
tivities did not necessarily require great haste; for instance, promptness was not 
needed in obtaining an expert opinion concerning physical evidence.59 
The views concerning the need for the functioning of the institution of the ex-
amining magistrate and of the inquiry were diametrically different in Europe. They 
ranged from the conviction that these institutions were indispensible to claims 
stating that they were groundless or even harmful. There were also voices which 
claimed that they were achievements of legal civilization as well as an expression 
of high culture of the legislation and legal system as they guaranteed personal 
liberty of the accused and the dignity of the justice system because they prevented 
the initiation of the procedures without sufficient grounds. It was emphasized that 
the inquiry is an indispensible preliminary factor to judge a crime and a criminal 
and even that it was “dusza procesu” [the soul of the procedure] as it gave it shape 
and form, provided the means to uncover the truth, influenced the course of the 
proceedings and of the adjudication. It also provided all the necessary safeguards 
to complete the mission of justice at the same time. It was simultaneously empha-
sized that examining magistrates had to be excellently prepared to perform this 
extremely important function as all the mistakes and dereliction of duty on their 
part constituted a danger for the most important interests of the citizens. However, 
there were also voices claiming that the inquiry is “zabytek” [a relict] of the old 
procedure, which brought with it numerous negative consequences. Among them 
were: wasting time and resources, creating an artificial division of responsibility 
between the prosecutor and the examining magistrate, depriving the main trial of 
independence and freshness, and restricting the rights of the accused.60 In Poland, 
as it is evident from the described discussion above, the majority of positions on 
the topic were placed in the middle, which did not generally reject the institu-
tion of the examining magistrate or of the inquiry itself but they rather postulated 
a deep and sensible change. The change was mainly to consist in a more proper 
placement of the prosecutor and of the examining magistrate in relation to one 
another. In this situation, the examining magistrate would not be deprived of the 
liberty to make decisions, while the prosecutor would be forced to impose certain 
specified actions on them.61 
Many of the arguments which were appearing in the course of this interwar 
discussion concerning the validity as well as the shape of the institution of the 
59 J. Wayzner, Przygotowawcze postępowanie karne... [The criminal preliminary procedure...], 
pp. 433–434.
60 W. Nestorowicz, Różne poglądy na potrzebę śledztwa [Different opinions on the need of the 
inquiry], “Głos Sądownictwa” [The Voice of the Judiciary] 1933, issue 5, pp. 13–17.
61 J.E. Grabowski, W obronie... [In defence...], p. 871.
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examining magistrate are expressed even today.62 A number of doubts which have 
been born during the century remain current until now and so they have not been 
solved in a satisfactory manner. However, the present-day discussion concerning 
the institution of the examining magistrate concentrates more on the model of the 
criminal procedure, especially its preliminary phase, rather than on the subject 
matter of the examining magistrate. Only answers to the questions concerning 
the shape of the preliminary procedure as well as the relation between the pre-
liminary procedure and the court proceedings can make a formulation of further 
conclusions concerning, among others, the institution of the examining magistrate 
possible, namely: is there a place for it in this procedure, and if so, what is it? 
62 Nowy model postępowania przygotowawczego – sędzia śledczy. Konferencja... [A new mod-
el of the preliminary procedure – the examining magistrate. A conference...], Warsaw 2010.
